cleverhans: A library for benchmarking vulnerability to adversarial examples
cleverhans is a software library that provides standardized reference implementations of adversarial example construction techniques and adversarial training. It may be used to develop more robust machine learning models and to provide standardized benchmarks of models' performance in the adversarial setting.
Semi-supervised Knowledge Transfer for Deep Learning from Private Training Data
Some machine learning applications involve training data that is sensitive, such as the medical histories of patients in a clinical trial. A model may inadvertently and implicitly store some of its training data; careful analysis of the model may therefore reveal sensitive information. To address this problem, we demonstrate a generally applicable approach to providing strong privacy guarantees for training data. The approach combines, in a black-box fashion, multiple models trained with disjoint datasets, such as records from different subsets of users. Compared with previous work, the approach imposes only weak assumptions on how teachers are trained: it applies to any model, including non-convex models like DNNs. We achieve state-of-the-art privacy/utility trade-offs on MNIST and SVHN thanks to an improved privacy analysis and semi-supervised learning.
Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samples
Adversarial examples that affect one model often affect another model, even if the two models have different architectures or were trained on different training sets, so long as both models were trained to perform the same task. We introduce new transferability attacks between previously unexplored (substitute, victim) pairs of machine learning model classes, most notably SVMs and decision trees. We demonstrate our attacks on two commercial machine learning classification systems from Amazon (96.19% misclassification rate) and Google (88.94%) using only 800 queries of the victim model, thereby showing that existing machine learning approaches are in general vulnerable to systematic black-box attacks regardless of their structure. This paper is under peer-review.
Practical Black-Box Attacks against Deep Learning Systems using Adversarial Examples
Machine learning models, including DNNs, were shown to be vulnerable to adversarial samples—subtly (and often humanly indistinguishably) modified malicious inputs crafted to compromise the integrity of their outputs. Adversarial examples are known to transfer from one model to another, even if the second model has a different architecture or was trained on a different set. We introduce the first practical demonstration that this cross-model transfer phenomenon enables attackers to control a remotely hosted DNN with no access to the model, its parameters, or its training data. In one experiment, we force a DNN supported by MetaMind (one of the online APIs for DNN classifiers) to mis-classify inputs at a rate of 84.24%. This paper is under peer-review.
Distillation as a Defense to Adversarial Perturbations against Deep Neural Networks.
I introduced a defensive mechanism called defensive distillation to reduce the effectiveness of adversarial samples, inputs crafted by adversaries with the intent of causing deep neural networks to misclassify. This work combines an analytical and empircal investigation of the generalizability and robustness properties granted by the use of defensive distillation during training. The study shows that defensive distillation can reduce effectiveness of sample creation from 95% to less than 0.5% on a studied deep neural network. This work was accepted to the 37th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings. Research on deep learning security.
I studied imperfections in the training phase of deep neural networks that make them vulnerable to adversarial samples: inputs crafted by adversaries with the intent of causing deep neural networks to misclassify. I formalized the space of adversaries against deep neural networks (DNNs) and introduced a novel class of algorithms to craft adversarial samples based on a precise understanding of the mapping between inputs and outputs of DNNs. This work was accepted at the 1st IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Ph.D. & M.S. in Computer Science and Engineering
As a graduate student at Penn State, I find a special interest in computer security and machine learning related issues.
M.S. in Engineering Sciences
As a graduate student at Ecole Centrale de Lyon, I covered many different engineering fields including Computer Science, Electrical engineering, Mathematics, and Signal Processing.
